I'd say yes.

After all, Matt posted the story about Obama being on Fox news with just as much vetting as the Fox News Madrassa "scoop"

Nominating Warner to replace Warner...  Tricksy.

I wonder what % of the vote could swing on low-info voters mistaking Mark Warner for the incumbent...

The problem is that Obama's rhetorical positions tend to be a lot more centrist than his actual votes and policy positions.  I'm sure it's intentional - it's always been clear that Obama is doing his best to be perceived as a candidate who is willing to reach out to his idealogical opponents in order to get things done.

The problem this runs into is that many progressives are not willing to accept even the language of compromise.  It's ironic, given the "my way or the highway" philosophy of our common enemy, that we seem to exhibit the same behavioral patterns when we see someone who is on our side display a willingness to compromise.

Perhaps we feel that the only way we can counter an opposition that uses brute force to ensure idealogical unity and conformity is by becoming just as conformist?

Slightly different Obama quote:
"What we might do is look at a bill giving a short-term appropriation," Obama said. "And keep the president on a shorter leash."

Still consistent with the earlier ones, but there's a pretty big contrast between this stance (one which I've seen mentioned as a viable approach - force funding renewal every 3 months or so to keep the issue in the spotlight) and the one which many here are reading into the other quotes.

I think that there's an awful lot of condemnation going on based on an inference of his position, and not necessarily on his actual position.

The premise is wrong though - we're not really talking about the effect on Democratic popularity if we withdraw - we don't have the votes to actually force a withdrawal over a veto.

So in essence, we're arguing about whether or not to make a statement in support of withdrawal in spite of the fact that actual withdrawal is unrealistic at this point in time.  That's a legitimate argument - but arguing against including withdrawal language shouldn't be construed as being against withdrawal.  Given the current context, it's possible to be for withdrawal but against including withdrawal language in the supplemental.  Legitimate arguments can be made that by not trying to stand on withdrawal language now, we increase the chances that we can successfully make a stand on the point later, even.

(My personal opinion is that the withdrawal language is a decent move, but that there are stronger ones available to us.  However, this being the path it seems congressional leadership has decided upon, I support it.)

He's trying for middle ground positioning.  If the stated position is that he's against legislated withdrawal, but feels that the funding for the troops is too important to hold up, then his voting pattern is consistent with the stance.

I'm not saying I agree with his original vote on the amendment, but he could have his reasons to vote that way and then vote the other way on final passage.

It was Pryor.

Roll call here:

http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/ro ll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?con gress=110&session=1&vote=00126

The trick is to load the revised supplemental with things (such as Stem Cell Research, curbs on domestic surveillance, and curbs on executive power) which have broad public support but which are antithetical to the administration and likely to be vetoed.

While this particular situation may be an exceptional case (I think separation of powers generally assumes a basic level of competence in each branch of government...), the grounds for the administration making a stand on the point of the withdrawal language are defensible, and potentially damaging to Democrats.

Blocking troop funding for any other reason, however, would prove nearly impossible to defend.  If we can put Bush in the position of having no defendable move but to sign the supplemental, we can either get some things passed which we'd otherwise have no chance of, or we can force the administration to make a veto which is absolutely indefensible to public opinion.

Bush needs the supplemental badly.  I'm not suggesting that we refuse to pass anything without a deadline - it's a very idealistic stance, but I don't think they'd cave, and the money needs to go out to the troops - but if Bush vetoes anything that falls short of withdrawal language, it's a refusal to fund the troops that's a LOT less ambiguous than the initial veto.

I hope so.

The signing statements need to be brought down by the courts.  That scenario would invariably get them there.

I think the thing to do after the Veto of the bill with the withdrawal language is to do what I advocate here...

That is, as quickly as possible, send a different bill back to the president, minus the withdrawal language, but with a repeal of the ban on federal spending for stem cell research.

The chances of actually forcing an administration that doesn't want to withdraw to withdraw (without a majority capable of overriding a veto) is minimal to nonexistant at this point.

So after the veto we need to turn the situation as much to our advantage as possible - to me, that means using the leverage to either get a different popular measure passed (Stem cell research), or forcing the president to issue a second veto, which would be totally indefensible to the public.   Another option would be to put restrictions in the bill which come short of withdrawal - but would still be enough to provoke a veto, given the premium this administration places on consolidation of power.

The strategy, essentially, is to force the administration to make a series of increasingly indefensible moves, or to force them to give in on an issue that they don't want to.

We may not be able to force withdrawal, but we have a pretty big lever to work with here to get other goals accomplished.

The one key is to work quickly - we need to ensure as much as possible that any delays in funding are due to executive recalcitrance and not due to congressional wrangling.

I'm not sure you actually read the post.  

The point isn't that withdrawal would be a bad thing.  I'm fully in support of getting out of Iraq.  The fact of the matter, however, is that we don't have the political power right now to override a veto and force that.

Given that, the question turns to how we can get the best return out of the appropriations process - my assertion is that we can get more mileage out of forcing the administration to veto troop funding on a basis unrelated to withdrawal than we can out of forcing the administration to veto troop funding by inserting a withdrawal requirement.

It's pragmatic rather than idealistic - but given the right wing media, it's hard to be certain that our message will win out when Bush vetoes the withdrawal bill.  The fact of the matter is that the bad guys have been better at mainstream media control than we have been, and this is going to be entirely a battle of mainstream media control.

Nitpick:

The Senate voted on language that would remove the timeline from the Senate version of the bill - and Sununu voted "yes".

It's the same conclusion, but the specifics presented in the original story are incorrect.

A signing statement in this case would almost certainly cause the constitutionality of signing statements to come under immense scrutiny - and I don't think they can hold up to that.

Not that I'm aware of.  That was the tally that was just announced in the Senate.

Yays 48
Nays 50

Amendment doesn't go through.