With her denial of President Obama's budget request for $4.4 billion in development assistance to Afghanistan, citing corruption, Rep. Nita Lowey has opened an opportunity to examine the principle forms of assistance to the country, what works and what doesn't. The fact is that all Afghan development programs are not alike. Lowey would do well to redirect the funds which were destined for USAID, which would be most of the funds in question, to Afghanistan's widely-hailed National Solidarity Program (NSP), which thus far has managed to elude Karzai government rapaciousness, and begun to lift this population 40% of which is malnourished into their own economic destiny.

What is now understood beyond the shadow of a doubt is that military operations can serve no further purpose in Afghanistan,and the focus must be on what works and what doesn't in terms of civilian aid. Congress must vote "no" this week on funding for anything but orderly withdrawal, and such carefully-targeted assistance. If we abandon Afghanistan economically as we have so often in the past after it has served our "Great Game" purposes, people will again starve en masse and civil war will ensue.

President Obama himself acknowledged last Sunday at the Toronto G-20 that the Taliban is a "mix of hardcore ideologues and kids who sign up because it's the best job they can get".

The NSP has in the past distinguished itself for competent, village-led projects and the organization of over 30,000 elected village councils. The village councils vote on the way grants will be spent, whether it be for the clearing of irrigation canals, digging of new irrigation trenches, or basic leveling and improvment of dirt roads, which are the vast majority of the roads in Afghanistan. The projects aim at hiring local youth at dignified labor which helps their own communities.

War hawks cite the mantra that "we don't do nation-building," but so far we have spent $250 billion in military operations in a country with an entire GDP of $12 billion a year. That's pretty expensive "non-nation-building" compared to the $4 billion Lowey is denying.

What distinguishes the NSP is the multiple layers of review of projects and costs before any funds are released. The funds themselves are held in trust outside of Afghanistan, in an account managed by the World Bank, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. The NSP has so far implemented over 25,000 village level projects, with villagers actively involved in all phases. Accounts for ongoing projects are posted publically for all villagers to scrutinize, often nailed to a tree.

A 2007 article in the Washington Monthly which positively reviewed the NSP, "The Schools the Taliban Won't Torch," reported that:

“The World Bank estimates that projects built by the NSP in Afghanistan are on average 30 percent cheaper than those built by foreign NGOs. And unlike too many other development projects in Afghanistan, the NSP doesn't involve American troops.”

Furthermore, the NSP is the program which has been most shortchanged in the past. Frankie Sturm reports for Wired Magazine:

“Hundreds of billions of dollars into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. has spent a paltry sum on one of the few programs that has been hailed as a success by Afghans and international aid groups alike.”

The absence of foreign troops in this development model is a key: the Taliban targets any help which is associated with the US military as collaboration with the occupier, which invites retaliation, including the slaughter of villagers. Because the NSP is viewed as a fundamentally Afghan-led program, whose primary mover, former Minister Ehsan Zia, is seen as honest and not part and parcel of the Karzai circle, attacking NSP projects is more problematic for the Taliban. The villagers vote on the projects, own them, and build them, earning much needed wage income in the process. This contrasts with US military-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are seen as bribes.

Many in the US command have recognized this, and come out for the NSP. Col. Chris Koleda, a Special Advisor to General Stanley McChrystal, told the Army Times:

“The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development has a great program called the National Solidarity Program, where money is given in block grants from an Afghan reconstruction trust fund directly to a village, so the village owns the project, the village operates the project, the people in the village are employed.”

Col. Kolenda has witnessed a phenomena which again shows that the insurgency is largely economically-driven, and unsolvable by military occupation. If what Kolenda says is true, it makes the case for the Congress to vote "no" on further funding for military operations and placing its bets for stability on the NSP:

“I’ve seen time and again, when communities have sufficient support and leverage they just start kicking these [ideologically-driven Taliban] out of their local areas.”

Although Rep. Lowey's concern for waste and fraud does not seem to extend to the exponentially larger sums being voted upon for military operations which will wind up in the pockets of American contractors like Halliburton and Dyncorp, her challenge to Obama's development request can nevertheless be seen as an opportunity to examine what works in Afghanistan and what doesn't. An alternative to approving Obama's request for funds which would go mainly to the USAID, which has been criticized on both the American and Afghan side for poor management, would be to direct this sum to deposited in the World Bank trust fund which funds the NSP, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

Lowey could then initiate a review of the current status of the National Solidarity Program before allowing any of the new funds to be committed to projects. She would do well to meet with the man who is considered the "father" of the NSP, who has the respect of so many ordinary Afghans as being an honest man, dedicated only to his people, Ehsan Zia. In this way it is possible to punish President Karzai for the corruption he has allowed to flourish, without punishing the poorest of these poor and starving people, who when all is said and done, are the ones who must be won over in order to succeed in the war against non-Afghan Al Qaeda.

PDF Slide Show: "Understanding the Afghan National Solidarity Program"

Former NSP Minister Ehsan Zia

PLEASE EMAIL THIS POST TO NITA LOWEY'S CHIEF OF STAFF, ELIZABETH STANLEY Elizabeth.stanley@mail.house.gov

PLEASE CALL TO ASK THAT FUNDS FOR AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT BE REDIRECTED TO THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM, CONTINGENT UPON REVIEW OF THE PROGRAM'S PRESENT STATUS AND LEADERSHIP. PUNISH KARZAI, NOT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

Phone: 202-225-6506
Fax 202-225-0546

As chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Sen. John Kerry has a hand in the crafting of foreign policy second only to the President and the Secretary of State.  The following is a letter sent to him urging a course correction in Afghanistan, which he has the power to effect.

Dear Senator Kerry,

The war in Afghanistan is about to enter a new phase, and we are on the cusp of a new level of violence.  After eight years of occupation, the vast majority of Afghans remain mired in wretched poverty, and offensive operations by the U.S. military have been counter-productive.  The misallocation of aid is well-understood by Afghans, who see the "narco-mansions" and the new SUVs of foreign contractors while most can barely eat.

To say that "nation-building" is outside of the scope of the limited mission is to miss entirely the nature of the insurgency, which is ultimately the result of a failed reconstruction and rampant 40% unemployment.  This places the Taliban in the position of being the employer of last resort, able to pay a young demographic of potential new fighters a wage of $10 per day.

Although the Taliban remains widely unpopular, it is now becoming "less unpopular" than the American presence, which, given the Taliban's reputation for brutality, took some doing. But eight years after the occupation began, 40% of children are underweight, 35% of the population is malnourished, and one in five infants dies before the age of five.  AOL news reports that hunger is Afghanistan's biggest killer.

Allowing people to starve, while spending hundreds of billions on jet fuel contracts, bombs and bullets, is a violation of the Geneva Conventions, which outline the responsibilities of an occupying power at Article 55:

"To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate."

Policy-makers are badly miscalculating the nature of Afghan nationalism, and offensive military operations which harm the Afghan people should be abandoned.  It was believed by Afghans that after the US abandonment to starvation and civil war in the 80's, that this time the promises of a reconstruction would be kept.  In Afghan culture, the second betrayal is far worse than the first.  We are on the verge of letting it happen.

This disaster can be averted, as can civil war.  This can be done at a cost to the US of what we spend on military operations in less than one month, or about $5 billion.  The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is an Afghan government program which is already in place, is of proven competence, and which has the capacity to immediately provide employment on a wide scale.

For far less than the cost of one month of military operations a widespread cash-for-work program could be implemented for everyone.

Some Americans will say this is ridiculous when there are not enough jobs right here in the U.S. But Americans don't work for $5 a day, and Afghans are happy to. It's not the $5 billion we spend on a civilian solution in Afghanistan that will break the bank and take away jobs from Americans. It's the $250 billion and counting that we have spent on counterproductive military operations and hardware.

The crucial aspects of the NSP are:

- The election of nearly 30,000 community development councils (CDCs) by each village, which choose from among different project proposals which both generate employment and benefit the communities,

- The selection of the council treasurer by the villagers themselves, who are best-placed to decide who is honest and competent,

- The sense of "buy in," or community ownership by the community, which both drives the communities to defend NSP projects against Taliban attack, and prevents Taliban attack due to the bad "public relations" it incurs.  

-  The existence of thousands of projects already on the drawing board, ready to implement immediately in order to hire many thousands of workers.  These projects lack only funding. The Honorable Ehsan Zia, the architect of the NSP, has been on Capitol Hill many times requesting this funding.

NSP projects tend to be simple: canal clearing, digging irrigation trench, and basic dirt road improvements using gravel and dirt, anything which puts a cash wage of about $7 per day, good money here, in the hands of economically desperate young men.

Please back an appropriation which is a small fraction of yearly military spending for the NSP.  Surely we can divert one month of what we spend on military operations into something that really works.  It is in ordinary, poor Afghans, and tribal society, that we will find our best allies in the "war on terror."  Let us not betray the Afghan people again, Senator.

Please email this post to John Kerry's Chief-of-Staff: david_wade@kerry.senate.gov Then call to confirm he received it:

(202) 224-2742 - Phone
(202) 224-8525 - Fax